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Abstract 
The first part of this essay provides a brief summary of this journal’s first editorial, which 
examined eight needed developments and eight critical contexts for global inquiry. The second 
part addresses our expanding circle of ethics, which starts with kin but has gradually increased to 
include tribes, states, nations, and even the world. It is our expanding circle of ethics that has led 
to a heightened awareness of equality, the product of a noble goal with origins in recent social 
justice movements. The aim of this essay is to assert that the field has a promising future by 
including both the local and the global, a position that reflects how our own moral sense has 
moved beyond kin relations to the entire human family.  
 
Introduction 
One of the great pleasures of psychology is that it can reveal our deepest biases and beliefs, a 
useful trick for anyone interested in self-improvement. Consider the halo effect. It is a human 
curiosity how someone who is handsome or beautiful will be granted more latitude than someone 
who is average or ugly. We assume that attractive people are smarter, friendlier, more adept at a 
wider range of skills, and even occupy a loftier moral ground. We think these things of beautiful 
people not because they are true but because they tap into our own desire for approval and status. 
Perhaps most interesting about this bias is not that psychology can reveal its effects or prove that 
we like elegance, fitness, or beauty. It is interesting because, despite its obviousness, the fact 
goes almost unnoticed or unchecked. You can teach someone all about the halo effect and then 
help them try to counter it in everyday life, but it will invariably fail. The halo effect is not only 
invisible; it is an agonizingly deep aspect of our psychological makeup that can only be 
weakened through extensive education (Kahneman, 2011). 
 
The modern denial of culture suffers from a similar slight, although for different reasons. Ours is 
a climate that resists the notion of a common or core set of values and beliefs, an elementary 
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form of sociality that might actually permeate a cluster of people in a specific geographic region. 
On the one hand, this makes sense because every person has different talents and traits. Any 
parent with more than one child knows that an instruction manual used for one is unlikely to 
work very well for the other. Even identical twins are known to be no more alike as senior 
citizens than any other randomly selected pair of people (Harris, 2006). On the other hand, 
anyone who has ever left their native land for even a brief jaunt into a foreign culture knows that 
some things really are different, even if they are unable to figure out why. This means that 
something has to bind people who are unlike us, and the most likely candidate for that is culture. 
 
This essay attempts to upend the problem of why a tacit theory of sociology, even when 
acknowledged in secret, is sometimes reviled in public. It is my claim that a sociological theory 
of culture is debunked for two main reasons, each of which has a basis in otherwise sound ideas. 
This essay examines these two problems by first recapping our journal’s inaugural editorial. That 
introduction outlined eight needed developments and eight critical contexts for global inquiry, all 
of which have been stunted because of two main reasons. The first of these is best understood 
through what is now known as our expanding circle, which has seen our radius of reciprocity go 
beyond kin to now include friends, colleagues, groups, tribes, states, nations, and even the world. 
The second is a fear of inequality, a predictable offshoot of societies that nurture the ethical 
doctrine of the expanding circle. Many well-intentioned scholars deny a sociological theory of 
culture because they worry it will descend into mere stereotype. There is little doubt that the 
conditions that set in motion an expanding circle are firmly entrenched in otherwise profound 
ethical goals. But taken to a logical end, they result in anxiety and fear about how best to work in 
a global context. In fact, my goal is to convince you of this point through simple but often 
overlooked theories of human sociality.  
 
State of the Field 
The inaugural issue of this journal featured an introduction by its founding editor that outlined 
eight needed developments and eight critical contexts for global inquiry (Thatcher, 2010). The 
aim of these developments and contexts was to call for engagement and participation, an attempt 
to incite involvement from the larger global community. The call was meant to address a few 
outstanding concerns of the field and its implications for a global audience. At the root of these 
differences is a fundamental aspect of what makes different groups of people tick, a need to 
acknowledge such differences, and to then fold them within our best practices and research 
methods. The hope is for these recommendations to serve as a springboard for future work, in 
either agreement or conflict. Here are those eight developments and eight critical contexts. 
 
The first needed development is to move from the local to the global. As Thatcher documents, 
the vast majority of intercultural research takes place within the perspective of equality matching 
and not communal sharing (2010). This is an important point because if a researcher is 
attempting to understand another culture, one that may or may not be individualistic in nature, 
then such a method is likely to be informed by her cultural context. That is, if a researcher hails 
from a culture that cultivates equality matching and she studies one that prefers communal 
sharing, then her methods and results are likely to reflect a local way of viewing the world. A 
researcher may think she is doing international or global research by virtue of having crossed an 
international border, but if her lens is primarily X then she will view Y as though it is or should 
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be X. Such practices may be sincere in an attempt to strive for a global framework but will suffer 
the consequences of having remained local.  
 
The second development is moving beyond monocultural methods. Again, if a researcher 
assumes a framework based on equality matching as an ideal, then that is going to inform 
everything from the hypothesis to the kinds of questions asked, data collected, and even its 
analysis. The real problem, though, is that it affects one’s philosophical worldview. In the jargon 
of research, this can mean anything from logical positivism to social construction. But in terms 
of the field’s current status, it more often means neocolonialism, orientalism, and ethnocentrism, 
philosophies that depend on equality matching at the expense of communal sharing.  
 
A third development is a willingness to act on a global framework by not reflexively invoking a 
method that emphasizes equality matching. Instead of assuming that all cultures want to be 
individualistic, or that they should be studied in this way, it is far more fruitful to think of 
cultures as equal but different. This very notion hits at the heart of the entire problem because it 
is based on the assumption that equality must be analogous to sameness. In terms of logic, this is 
known as a fallacy of equivocation because it confuses one thing for something else despite all 
evidence to the contrary. According to this line of reasoning, one should not compare an apple 
and an orange because the very act of comparison will elevate one over the other. While this can 
certainly happen, it can only take place if one is willing to slide down a dangerous slippery slope. 
Even though one is an apple and the other is an orange they are both, after all, just fruit. 
Similarly, the fourth needed development is moving from equality matching to multiple levels of 
analysis. One way to study culture is to systematize it, not because societies abide by a set of 
discrete physical laws but because of the utility of such an approach. It is crucial to not merely 
zoom in and out of a given culture to understand it at its many levels, but to also see how one 
part also affects other parts. This perspective can only take place if researchers extract 
themselves from the perspective of equality matching.  
 
The fifth point is a call for basic quantitative literacy. The majority of scholars interested in this 
journal come from some kind of a humanities background. Despite the many advantages of 
learning about human nature through language, literature, literacy, and linguistics, these 
disciplines are not always quick to use a range of analytical tools. In fact, most research methods 
currently in use embrace only one end of the continuum. At the far end sits ethnography, which 
is a research method popularized by anthropologists in the early 20
th
 century to help study 
foreign cultures. Its methods are not overtly systematic, requiring little more than a pen, paper, 
and a willingness to live among an indigenous population long enough to write a paper, thesis, or 
book. Hypotheses, research questions, pilot studies, formalized methodologies, data 
triangulation, and debriefing are not commonly part of ethnographic research.  
 
This is entirely fine, of course, until scholars borrow these methods to study phenomena for 
which a fair amount is already known. Instead of using a more rigorous qualitative methodology, 
or even a quantitative one, scholars have typically borrowed anthropological methods without 
actually visiting a foreign culture. Ethnographic methods are only useful in new and novel 
situations, something that is hard to find these days. It is quite possible that a continuation of 
these methods prevail because there is so little quantitative literacy in the field and even less 
desire to self-correct. 
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The sixth needed development calls for humility, reflexivity, and flexibility. This might be good 
advice for many of us, but it certainly applies to researchers who believe that culture should be 
examined from one and only one perspective. Humility helps provide a realistic assessment of 
our place in the world, reflexivity the ability to act on it, and flexibility the skills to adapt as 
conditions change. This point cannot be understated because most intercultural conflict takes 
place somewhere along these three points. Flexibility is arguably the most important of the three 
because, in abundance, it can help weather problems of humility and reflexivity. Regardless of 
their relationship, the advice is not only good in life but is actually critical in terms of culture. 
 
The seventh is a need for effective theory and practice. This is of such special importance that it 
is difficult to summarize in a single paragraph. Most readers of this journal are comfortable with 
and probably enjoy negotiating the complexities of theory, a pleasure not enjoyed by everyone. 
Theoretical inquiry takes place through abstraction, an ability to see how two or more parts 
might fit together within a larger sphere of knowledge. While there will always be a need for 
pure theorists, we also need people who can apply these ideas to practical situations. The 
difference between theorists and those who apply its ideas captures the essence of how one group 
of people study culture in terms of equality matching and another group studies culture in terms 
of comparative frameworks.  
 
The last needed development is a workable ethics that can be used in a global context. An ethical 
system based on subjective opinion of highly localized context might be theoretically 
advantageous but will fail to meet the test of application within a global framework. As will be 
addressed in the following section, all neurotypical people are endowed with an innate moral 
sense that must adapt to the demands of a given situation. This does not mean that ethics is a 
subjective affair, only that life is a complex theatre of human activity.  
 
Thatcher goes on to illustrate how these eight needed developments can and should be examined 
in eight critical contexts, although he points out many more. The eight that he lists include 
second language studies and neuroscience, information technology, organizational behavior and 
global relations, distance education, legal traditions, health literacy, instructional design, and 
intercultural curriculum and research. In each of these endeavors, there is a need to study not 
only ways in which theory may arise and then explain these problems but also how these same 
ideas can be put to good use. 
 
All of these obstacles are based on two key social movements. The first of these is what 
philosopher Peter Singer has coined the expanding circle. Ours is a species that has an innate 
capacity for kin reciprocity in which we share a close bond with members of our family. This is 
an important point to make because the same cannot be said of colleagues, acquaintances, and 
strangers. There has to be some kind of reason why we clog the airports every holiday. For 
various reasons, we have pushed the boundaries of kin relations to also include members of the 
group. We are much more likely to do favors for close friends than for someone who resides 
outside of the group. Singer argues that this is not an innate urge, like the one for family, but one 
based on the elements of sociality and a higher level of reason (2011).  
 
The second movement is what I call a fear of inequality, which has roots in obviously good and 
upstanding views about how different people should be treated. The problem is that the drive to 
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treat other people fairly does not come as naturally as our own family. The first question that 
should pop up in such a situation is why this should be the case and how it effects work in the 
field. The moral implications of how we arrived at fearing inequality must first begin with how 
we ever reasoned our way into an expanding circle of moral reciprocity. 
 
The expanding circle 
In 1981, Australian philosopher Peter Singer wrote a book called The Expanding Circle. In it 
Singer tried to fold in new research from evolutionary psychology and, in particular, E. O. 
Wilson’s landmark work Sociobiology. One of the key points made by Wilson was that the 
animal kingdom seemed to betray an unusual paradox. If natural selection is about survival of the 
fittest, nasty in tooth and claw, then how is it that altruism can be found in species ranging from 
birds to elephants to humans? It seemed that any organism willing to do a selfless act for another 
was hardly doing anything that would help it survive and, quite possibly, might even be 
hastening itself to an early grave. Singer reasoned that the answer to this question was neither 
exclusively biological nor exclusively behavioral, but a combination of both. Singer set out to 
discover the building blocks of what makes people do good acts when there seems to be no 
obvious incentive. Resolving this question is not only fundamental for readers of this journal, but 
actually sets in place a foundation for figuring out how we got to our hyperactive attention to 
equality. 
 
Singer starts off with a few examples from the non-human animal kingdom (we are, after all, just 
one mammal among many). Blackbirds and thrushes are known to give out warning calls when a 
hawk is seen overhead. These calls presumably serve as warnings for other birds in the area but 
also seem to come at some cost. Any time a bird gives out a warning, it does so at an increased 
risk of being eaten. Although these calls are more difficult to locate than others, they surely put 
birds at greater risk than merely hiding among branches. Singer starts off by asking why birds 
would bother doing such a thing when it seems to confer no advantage and considerable 
disadvantage. He then goes on to list other animals such as wild dogs, gazelles, elephants, and 
other primates that also show acts of altruism with no obvious expectation of reciprocity. There 
is even the curious act of when animals forego a chance to kill a rival. Singer notes that a wolf 
who admits defeat will bear the underside of its neck in deference to his victor, who could but 
does not inflict a final lashing. If the victor is from the same social group, he will simply leave 
without a kill. 
 
The origin of our altruism begins with kin, the bonds that bind our closest relatives. Its logic is 
defined not by what is best for the group, a common misunderstanding, but by what is best for 
our genes. This is because your children possess roughly fifty percent of your genes, your 
siblings possess fifty percent of your genes, and their children possess twenty-five percent of 
your genes, and so on. Devotion to your children and the odds that you would risk your life for 
theirs is not based on their charming smiles or aptitude for music or mathematics. It is because 
they share roughly fifty percent of your genetic makeup; they are vessels for passing on the 
family line. When you die, you can rest assured that a sizeable part of your genetic information 
will be passed onto future generations. In some biological way you are helping obtain a degree of 
immortality, a fact that helps explain the source of your moral impulse. 
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The link between evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, and ethics is obviously more 
complicated than this. We care for and do generous acts for non-kin because we like them, want 
to see them do well, share some view for how the world works, and enjoy an inexplicable 
connection. Even though we share no genetic bond there is another kind of link, that of 
friendship. But according to Singer, we have not stopped at the boundary that encapsulates 
family and friends. Our moral radius has gradually pushed farther away to also include tribes, 
groups, clans, states, nations, and even the entire planet. This might seem like an odd claim 
because there is no reason to believe that we have an innate tendency to care sincerely for 
strangers on the other side of the globe. If Singer is right then how can this be and why? 
 
According to Wright, three key traits in our species helped perpetuate the expanding circle 
(1996). They include cognition, language, and an emotional repertoire. Cognition refers to an 
ability to abstract through intuitive theories about how the world works. Each of us has an 
intuitive notion of “objects, forces, paths, places, states, substances, and other people’s desires 
and beliefs” (Pinker, 2010). We can take these abstract ideas to the natural world, use them to 
solve problems, scale up to higher levels of abstraction, which can then be used to solve even 
more difficult problems. The ability to coopt intuitive theories for solving problems is one sign 
of intelligence that leads to even higher levels of abstract problem solving, traits that would have 
been selected for by filling a cognitive niche (Pinker, 2010).  
 
Wright then goes on to argue that another reason for our expanding moral radius is because of 
our species’ knack for language, which is distinct from communication. Language may be 
defined as the ability to take a finite inventory of words and string them together in a nearly-
infinite array of combinatorial sentences. This is distinct from communication, which is the 
ability to convey an intentional signal to another organism without the benefit of recursion. Birds 
may be the most familiar example of a species that can communicate, but only outside the limits 
of language. Even bacteria communicate, but only on a chemical level. Most people rarely stop 
to think about the miracle of language, but just imagine what life would be like if you forever 
lost this basic skill. But perhaps the most important aspect of language is that it has the ability to 
explode individual knowledge. I can give you some of my fruit and fish but I can also use 
language to explain how you can get even more. 
 
The third and final reason moral sentiments have expanded our circle is because of a heightened 
emotional repertoire. This refers to a theory of mind, which is the ability to intuit the thoughts, 
values, feelings, and beliefs of other minds. Compared to other primates, we are a highly social 
species that must figure out how to negotiate a vast and sometimes complex network of 
individual minds. Evidence for this is found not only in the complex plots of our poems, 
literature, and movies but also in the thickness of our neocortex, which is directly related to 
sociality (Dunbar, 1998). An emotional repertoire also gives us the option of viewing the world 
through different eyes. If you are in conflict with someone, then it may be easier to disarm the 
situation through empathy, the ability to understand another person’s perspective.  
 
These three aspects of our species’ makeup—cognition, language, and an emotional repertoire—
help explain how we expanded our moral circle to go beyond the boundaries of kin and even 
close friends. But we have not simply expanded our moral circle to embrace people unlike us; we 
have also curtailed rates of violence. Some people find this to be a difficult idea to accept, 
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although the data is clear. Whether it is measured across centuries, generations, or decades, rates 
of violence have been declining steadily in nearly every corner of the globe.  
 
The rise and consolidation of nation states first set this remarkable fact in motion. Although it 
may seem to confound existing notions of how violence might decrease, it is actually beneficial 
if an overarching presence can police a region. Over time we saw a humanitarian revolution in 
which various forms of corporal punishment were abandoned, such as the global trend in 
eliminating the death penalty for non-lethal crimes. There was also the human rights revolution, 
which saw a host of social improvements. Vulnerable populations such as racial minorities, 
women, children, homosexuals, and even animals have been rightfully granted equal rights, first 
in theory but eventually and over time in practice. Statistical rates from around the world indicate 
an expanding circle through a reduction in hate crimes, racist attitudes, an increase in women’s 
rights, a reduction in domestic violence, better treatment of children, the decriminalization of 
homosexuality, and even animal rights. This last improvement can be seen in revised handling 
practices, an increase in vegetarianism, and even the oversight of animal welfare on the sets of 
blockbuster movies (Pinker, 2011).  
 
Of special interest to readers of this journal is a much broader reason for why rates of violence 
have declined, and that is international trade. This may seem the least likely of explanations for 
our expanding moral circle and why you have a smaller chance of being murdered today than at 
any other time in recorded history. Yet, there is a very good reason why it makes sense. It is 
relatively easy to imagine killing someone with whom you do no business, as there is no mutual 
interdependence. But the moment you begin trading with an adversary, the odds of either of you 
killing the other drop dramatically. A common example of this anxiety is found in the difference 
between the US and China, with some people fearing that China will present an overbearing 
threat to the US and its allies. China’s burgeoning space program, spy satellites, and military 
arsenal would seem to suggest a serious threat to western countries. Although theoretically true, 
the activation of this impulse seems farfetched. We owe China an awful lot of money, and they 
make all our stuff. Launching missiles at each other is not an especially useful business plan. 
 
This provides further proof that our circle has not only expanded in a qualitative sense; it has 
also improved quantitatively. The expanding circle that Singer presciently derived over thirty 
years ago is not just about bringing more people into an orbit of ethics but of also improving 
those principles already in place. Our gift for higher order thinking, language, and a sophisticated 
emotional repertoire gives us the means to break free from a circle of kin to a much larger sphere 
of sociality. But important as they are, groups do not provide the ultimate solution. 
 
Fear of inequality 
The fear of inequality begins not with the individual but with a natural desire to form groups, 
extends into the goal of keeping unwanted people out, and is reinforced through observations 
that are elevated to stereotype. Although its logic is bolstered by social pressures, its motives are 
innate (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). 
 
Despite the odds that most people strive to be free of dependence and control, there is little 
question that our species has an innate drive to form groups (Axelrod, 1986). Social groups are 
the foundation of our personal and professional lives. Even the most independent among us must 
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acknowledge that we get something useful out of friends and family. There is no society on the 
planet that fails to value the formation of groups, as it is impossible to think of other people 
without also thinking about how they fit into a larger social order. This is not to say that groups 
just expect people to be mindless clones. In fact, the institution of groups have to exploit a 
number of tricks to keep people from defecting, as anyone familiar with indoctrinations, rites, 
and rituals can attest (Atran 1998). 
 
Perhaps the best known example of how people will happily join a group, no matter how 
arbitrary, occurred in the Riceville, Iowa classroom of Jane Elliott. The story takes place in April 
of 1968, right after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. She was unsure of how to explain 
the loss of King, a difficulty made more apparent by the fact that Riceville was an all-white 
town. She decided to separate her students into two groups, one with blue eyes and other with 
brown. She explained how people with brown eyes were superior to people with blue eyes. All of 
the students with blue eyes had to sit at the back of the classroom. Students with brown eyes 
were told they were smarter, had more time to play at recess, were fitted with a collar so they 
could be identified at a distance, and were instructed to avoid socializing with blue-eyed 
students. The result was swift and shocking. Students with brown eyes became mean and 
discriminatory, even to the point of dissolving long-standing alliances and friendships. The 
following day Elliott decided to try another test, this time telling the class she was all wrong 
about eye color. It was not brown-eyed people who were superior, but people with blue eyes. 
This had an equal but opposite effect. Fifteen years later students from Elliott’s class were 
interviewed for a PBS special where it was said that this experience was the single most 
important learning event of their lives. The power of groups can be strong. 
 
The fear of inequality begins not with a few bad apples but with our very own species. There was 
nothing unusual about Elliott’s class. While her students attended an all-white school in rural 
Iowa, that does not explain the results. The problem is that we are, as a species, wholly vested in 
delineating one group of people from the next and then making sure others stay out of our group. 
While some groups cultivate values that make them more insular than others, the problem is 
actually far deeper. There is simply not enough time or resources to befriend everyone, which 
means we have to pick and choose. This trial-and-error process is not an environmental offshoot 
of a social motive but a deep instinctual trait. In terms of nature and nurture—and it is surely a 
combination of both—there is little doubt that evolution has stamped our species with a taste for 
ethnocentrism (Axelrod, 1986; Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). We expect our independence but 
relish the safety of groups, and that means keeping others at bay. 
 
The traits of ethnocentrism are defined by a range of behaviors that can be easily observed. Such 
variables may include appearance, ornamentation, politics, socioeconomics, religion, and even 
language and accent. The pursuit and maintenance of ethnocentrism is thought to place 
significant cognitive demands on a person, as there is a linear link in primates between degree of 
sociality and thickness of neocortex (Dunbar, 1998; Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). While there is 
little controversy in the claim that social and cultural inputs greatly affect the nature of 
ethnocentrism, there is extensive evidence supporting an innate predisposition for in-group 
behaviors. This turns out to be true even in the absence of direct environmental pressure or when 
the group is merely abstract. It is not simply the difference between brown and blue eyes; it can 
be about people and traits we have never before seen. 
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Communal sharing 
Although group membership confers a number of advantages, it also comes at some cost. In fact, 
joining and maintaining membership in a group typically requires a series of endless costs that 
are most noticeable at the beginning. There is also an extraordinary range of groups with which 
to participate, including family, education, health, recreation, and religion. Regardless of the 
group, all are guided by a core set of principles that reflect and reinforce their dynamics. They 
start off with trying to figure out what other people think. This extends into solving practical and 
existential problems reinforced through social rituals that are exploited through several cognitive 
quirks (Fiske, 1992; 2004).  
 
A theory of mind is what neurotypical people use when they try to infer the thoughts, values, 
feelings, and beliefs of other minds (Atran, 1998). Taken to one end of the spectrum, a theory of 
mind is the same cognitive faculty used to infer the presence of souls, gods, and spirits (minus a 
material body). A second feature of group membership is that it provides a number of benefits 
typically unavailable to individual people by helping solve a number of practical and existential 
problems. Practical problems may include hunting, gathering, and forming friendships and 
alliances. Groups can also help solve existential problems, especially when the practical fails. If 
science, law, and medicine are unable to grant certainty, then perhaps one can appeal to a higher 
authority. The third feature of group membership is that it often deals in matters that can be 
neither proven nor disproven. If a practical or existential matter appeals to no empirical proof 
then ceremony may be useful. Ceremony and commensal meals create a sense of social cohesion, 
a goal that can be solidified by people willing to endure great costs such as sacrificing animals, 
crops, and foreskins.  
 
The fourth and final feature of group membership is that is takes place by exploiting a series of 
cognitive quirks. The first of these is that it creates a sense of social cohesion. Families might be 
the prototype of group membership. Even though “you can’t choose your family,” there has to be 
some reason why people clog the airports around the holidays every year. Many people willfully 
visit their families on a fairly regular basis, even if begrudgingly, while the same cannot be said 
of colleagues, acquaintances, or strangers. The fact that non-kin relations do not enjoy the same 
family bonds helps explain why colleagues and acquaintances have to construct a series of 
rituals. To cite a religious example, the words “brethren,” “brother,” and “our father” seem 
designed to solve this very problem.  
 
Communal sharing is exploited by a second cognitive quirk, that of celebration. Birthdays, 
anniversaries, religious rites and rites of passage, initiations, judicial proceedings, and 
educational achievements are all examples of human endeavors that attempt to exploit a drive for 
communal sharing. A third cognitive quirk is ritualistic motion. Sports, medical procedures, and 
religious events all attempt to create a sense of communal sharing through ritualistic motion. In 
religious ceremonies, members of a church may stand, sing, and wave their hands in unison. 
Individual worshippers become submerged in the movement of the group. This is analogous to 
other behaviors seen in the animal kingdom, such as the V formation of birds. Unified movement 
that reinforces communal sharing takes place in many organisms or people who attempt to 
replicate the benefits of a single superorganism.  
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The fourth and final cognitive quirk exploited in the name of communal sharing is self-sacrifice. 
Because group membership confers a number of advantages it is important to weed out 
defectors, and one way of doing that is to erect obstacles or tests that only the dedicated are 
likely to satisfy. A player who regularly takes his last foul for the team, a soldier who charges the 
enemy line, and a mother who offers her son’s foreskin are all examples of the kinds of sacrifice 
required to gain admission into and remain a member of a group. 
 
The point is that communal sharing or in-group membership succeeds only because it requires its 
members to find a common bond, and few bonds are stronger than identifying how others are 
different. While societies have to deploy a number of tricks to get people to buy into group 
membership, it is hardly a monumental request. People who decide to go alone do so under 
tremendous uncertainty and the possibility that plans will not unfold in their favor.  
Equality matching 
If group benefits occupy one elementary form of sociality, then its inverse is equality matching. 
Although it is possible to collapse both values onto a single scale, it can also be useful to treat 
them as mutually exclusive. Unlike communal sharing, whereby the individual is absorbed 
within a group, equality matching is concerned with autonomy and fair treatment. Its logic is 
defined by a need and desire to contribute and distribute resources equally, a strong moral 
impulse for individual freedom, personal opinion, and the free-flow of ideas. If communal 
sharing is about making sure people conform, then equality matching is about figuring out how 
best to persuade. 
 
One way to think about the difference between communal sharing and equality matching is 
through a third form of elementary sociality—authority ranking (Fiske, 1992; 2004). All 
societies have a social physics in terms of space, time, magnitude, and force. Each of us occupies 
a finite amount of space, proceeds through it at a particular rate of time, is in possession of a 
given magnitude, and is capable of a certain amount of force. This means that people higher up 
on the food chain tend to be taller or made to appear that way, walk in front of the group instead 
of behind, enter first and wait less, and are capable of wielding social, political, financial, or 
physical force. A judge, king, or tyrant wears bulky or elaborate attire, is bigger or sits higher, 
walks in front or is carried along a procession, and can exercise authority by withholding or 
removing resources.  
 
Societies move away from authority ranking and toward equality matching for a variety of 
reasons, although one of the most important is socioeconomic. It is helpful to think of the 
relationship between socioeconomic status and equality matching as a linear function in which 
one increases simultaneously with the other. Consider what happens to a small family that lives 
in an even smaller home. Suppose there are six members of the family, two parents and four 
children, and a total of only two bedrooms. The master bedroom goes to the parents and the other 
goes to the remaining four children. It can be tricky sharing two rooms with six people, so the 
family does most of their socializing in the living room where a television and radio are shared. 
The smaller physical space means less privacy, independence, and freedom but comes with the 
added bonus of stronger family bonds through increased contact time. What happens if this same 
family wins the lottery? 
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Our family of six and their once-modest income now has the luxury of scaling up to a much 
larger home where everyone gets a room of their own, proper furniture, and personalized 
entertainment. Because each member of the family has their own space, there is far less reason to 
spend time in the living room watching television, listening to the radio, and socializing. The 
family has deemphasized its value of communal sharing and reallocated its energies toward 
equality matching. A shift from the group to the individual means more privacy, independence, 
and freedom but at the cost of weaker family bonds from decreased contact time. This does not 
mean that one member of the family will no longer help a sibling or parent, but it does suggest a 
weakened link between each of its members. The difference between shared and private rooms is 
unlikely to be consequential among kin, although the same could not be said of non-kin.  
 
It is this very dynamic of moving away from in-group preference and toward equality matching 
that captures the essence of the fear of inequality. As groups of people acquire greater 
socioeconomic wealth, so too does their inclination for equality matching. Less emphasis on 
groups and conformity results in greater degrees of personal freedom and non-conformity. The 
shift from communal sharing to equality matching is a process that leads to a fear of inequality. 
With greater individual freedom comes an anxiety about making sure everyone is equally free.  
 
One way to think of this is to return to our family. Before winning the lottery, the ritual of dinner 
was likely to be centered around a shared social experience. Much like societies with strong 
values toward communal sharing, our family before the lottery was probably less concerned 
about making sure that everyone took an equal amount of food. Instead, meals would have been 
seen as a collective experience in which everyone may or may not have invested the same 
amount of time, energy, and resources. Meals would have been eaten together in the same room 
and at roughly the same time each day. Counter this with what happens when the group is a little 
less cohesive, in part because of a larger house, more personal space, and the monetary means to 
take care of meals on an individual basis. Instead of a collective experience, everyone is able to 
find food on their own terms. This may mean having dinner together, although it is far more 
likely that, over time, each person will simply eat according to personal whim and schedules.  
 
Another way to think of how commensal meals can help explain the shift from communal 
sharing to equality matching is by looking at these same rituals around the world. In many 
societies, the act of preparing, consuming, and ritualizing meals is a central aspect of social life. 
French and Italian societies may spend hours with family and friends at any given meal, while 
the same cannot be said of Australians or Canadians. There has to be some reason why everyone 
collects around a mesab in Ethiopia, eating with their hands from the same enormous platter of 
food. While in the US, it is widely known that people are more likely to scream their order into a 
plastic clown, exchange money through a small window, and receive their feast in a small paper 
bag. This is not to say that mesabs and fast food are the cause of communal sharing or equality 
matching, but they are certainly aligned with a larger set of values about the pressures of 
conformity versus the effort and anxiety of equality.  
 
Conclusion 
In this journal’s first issue, Thatcher presented eight needed developments and eight critical 
contexts that can and should be used for global inquiry. Moving from the local to the global, 
moving beyond monocultural methods, having the courage to act in a global context, distancing 
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ourselves from equality matching to better understand societies that nurture communal sharing, 
basic quantitative literacy, a sense of humility and flexibility, effectively applying the problems 
of theory to those of practice, and finding a workable global ethic are the eight areas of needed 
development.  
 
As Thatcher further notes, each of these problems can be studied in a wide range of affairs. They 
include second language studies and neuroscience, information technology, organizational 
behavior, distance education, legal traditions, health literacy, instructional design, and 
intercultural research. All of these areas can be improved by scholars who maintain the 
importance of an expanding moral circle, assuming one avoids taking its precepts to their logical 
limit. Equality for every person is a worthy goal that speaks to how far we have come, but it 
should also not instill in us an equal but paralyzing fear that the only way to achieve it is through 
extreme subjectivity. The modern denial of culture has been a steady work in progress, one that 
surfaced from the high ideals of equal rights, social justice, and an expanding moral sense. 
Without question, the catalyst for the social relativism of today is rooted in the civil rights 
movement, the right of women to vote and attend university, greater understanding of disability, 
and the increased awareness of sexual orientation. That our species has identified these 
previously overlooked or stigmatized groups of people is a testament to the awesome progress 
we have made, with a promise that more success in these areas will follow.  
 
At the same time, a rejection of all innate faculties in the name of equality has led us down a 
dark, unproductive, and even volatile path. There is no truth, what is right for me is not for you, 
cancer may be genetic but intelligence is not, and even morality is pushed off into an irrational 
corner of obscurity. One of the great hallmarks of our recent past was realizing that certain 
groups of people are not inferior just because they look different. At the same time, rejecting 
fallacious assumptions about the predisposition of certain demographics should not be countered 
by an equal and equally absurd assumption that everything is idiosyncratically personal. Just 
because our ancestors were embarrassingly wrong about the intelligence and competence of 
certain groups of people does not mean that these things are entirely a function of the 
environment. This is just sliding down the other side of the same slippery slope. There is good 
evidence, in fact, that intelligence has been increasing across the board for decades, that it can be 
improved with training, and that a sizeable portion of it is heritable (Harris, 2006). Despite fears 
that some people have about appearing daft, it should be entirely respectable to admit that not 
everything is decided by environmental proxy. 
 
Such extreme thinking has magnified two intellectual fallouts, a flawed theory of mind and the 
fear of inequality. The ability to infer the thoughts, values, feelings, and beliefs of other minds is 
one aspect of human sociality. Our ancestors’ ability to guess what other people were thinking 
aided them in a wide range of human affairs. Ours is a hypersocial species that deals in such 
matters as conflict, cooperation, mind reading, manipulation, coordination, plausible deniability, 
rational ignorance, and the cultural transmission of knowledge (Krebs and Dawkins, 1984). We 
carry out these aspects of public life through a social physics of space, time, magnitude, and 
force. This is especially evident in matters of authority ranking, which is a testing ground for two 
other elementary forms of sociality—communal sharing and equality matching. A society’s shift 
from in-group preference to equality matching is one that often coincides with greater 
socioeconomic prosperity, heightened personal freedom, and equality matching.  
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Theory of mind, the expanding circle, and a fear of inequality help explain the problem of why 
people confuse a theory of psychology for sociology. An unchecked theory of mind results in the 
assumption that other minds want the same thing and are even driven by the same motives and 
goals. It is likely that the other minds problem is responsible for considerable 
miscommunication, one that gets magnified the instant it crosses cultures. This, in turn, leads to 
even greater problems as societies shift toward individual autonomy. The other minds problem is 
likely to enhance the predisposition a society may have for equality.    
 
All of this leads toward the dilemma of mixing a theory of psychology for one of sociology. 
Psychology deals with individual minds while sociology deals with them as a group. If theory of 
mind and a fear of inequality cause one to focus on what each person thinks then that in itself 
will lead one toward psychology instead of sociology. This is not to say that an emphasis on 
psychology is wrong, only that it is incapable of explaining how large groups of people carry on 
with the daily business of life. Getting away from the notion that everything true must also be 
subjective is the first step, one that will help us self-correct a different injustice that is our 
modern denial of culture. 
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